Mirror 01 / Primary
EU-1
98.67% uptime (30d)
v3 onion
0x7F2A sig
http://nexusbj3sjjjorrg2jnbdlf5xktaapk7rawiovmdpoimf5aiet4a2zid.onion
The three onions above are not load-balanced behind one box. Each mirror runs on independent infrastructure, in a different region, behind a separate Tor descriptor. A coordinated takedown of one mirror has zero effect on the other two. Latency variation between them reflects which exit nodes Tor is currently routing through, not load on the market core.
The custodians who hold the 2-of-3 escrow keys also rotate the daily timestamp signature. The signing happens on hardware key material, never on a host that touches the public network. Custody is split across at least three jurisdictions to prevent any single legal action from taking the signature offline.
Mirror retirement happens only when one of three conditions is met: sustained 30-day latency above 2 seconds, hosting provider takedown, or operator request after a key compromise. New mirrors are published here with 72 hours of overlap with the retired address before the old onion drops from the roster. Cross-signed migration notices are republished on each surviving mirror under /announcements.
Import the master key from the status page or any active mirror under /pgp.key. The fingerprint is 7F2A 9C41 66B8 E1D5 4832 19A4 88F3 BD2C 1E5A 0F77 ... 0A9D. Verify against at least two independent sources before trusting.
On the login page of any mirror, copy the signed timestamp block between BEGIN and END markers. Paste into a local file and run gpg --verify. The output should read Good signature with the fingerprint matching the master. Any other output, particularly BAD signature, is the mirror failing verification and the only correct response is to abandon the session.
The signed timestamp rotates daily. A timestamp older than 36 hours is also a verification failure, even if the signature is cryptographically valid. The freshness window is what proves the gateway you are looking at is current.